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ABSTRACT
A traditional explanation for why sovereign governments repay debts is that they want to keep a good
reputation so they can easily borrow more.  In our model, this explanation does not hold if a government
has access to an adequate savings technology regardless of its past actions.  Given such access, govern-
ments get only transient benefits from maintaining a good relationship with bankers, and such benefits
cannot support borrowing.  We argue that if a country is involved in a myriad of different trust relation-
ships, there can be reputation spillover to a nondebt relationship, such as the government’s relationship
with domestic workers, which has enduring benefits.  We show that such a spillover can allow a govern-
ment’s reputation to support a large amount of borrowing.
*The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Min-
neapolis or the Federal Reserve System.